But in the context of a Fourteenth Amendment challenge, courts must bear in mind the difference between what the law permits and what it requires. Majority Opinion/Decision. Five of the eight Justices who participated in the decision resolved the case under the framework the Court previously had adopted for vote-dilution cases. We have rejected such perceptions elsewhere as impermissible racial stereotypes. By perpetuating such notions, a racial gerrymander may exacerbate the very patterns of racial bloc voting that majority-minority districting is sometimes said to counteract. 1237, 1258 (1993). In favor of Shaw. Allen v. State Board of Elections(1969) (emphasis added). Croson, 488 U. S., at 494 (plurality opinion); see also id., at 520 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment). Hirabayashi v. United States(1943). In that, state efforts to remedy minority vote dilution are wholly unlike what typically has been labeled "affirmative action." Appellants contend that redistricting legislation that is so bizarre on its face that it is "unexplainable on grounds other than race,"Arlington Heights, demands the same close scrutiny that we give other state laws that classify citizens by race. More importantly, the majority's submission does not withstand analysis. Even Justice Whit-. of Gal. The principle of equality is at war with the notion that District A must be represented by a Negro, as it is with the notion that District B must be represented by a Caucasian, District C by a Jew, District D by a Catholic, and so on . That system, by whatever name it is called, is a divisive force in a community, emphasizing differences between candidates and voters that are irrelevant in the constitutional sense . "When racial or religious lines are drawn by the State, the multiracial, multireligious communities that our Constitution seeks to weld together as one become separatist; antagonisms that relate to race or to religion rather than to political issues are generated; communities seek not the best representative but the best racial or religious partisan. In our view, the court used the wrong analysis. That concession is wise: This Court never has held that race-conscious state decisionmaking is impermissible in all circumstances. Cf. United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144, 161-162 (1977) (UJO) (pluralityopinion of WHITE, J., joined by Brennan, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ. What appellants object to is redistricting legislation that is so extremely irregular on its face that it rationally can be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting, without regard for traditional districting principles and without sufficiently compelling justification. See post, at 684 (dissenting opinion). Express racial classifications are immediately suspect because, "[a]bsent searching judicial inquiry , there is simply no way of determining what classifications are 'benign' or 'remedial' and what classi-. Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political system in which race no longer matters--a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which the Nation continues to aspire. (equating various articulations of standards of review "more stringent" than "'reasonableness'" with "strict scrutiny"). U. S. At what time (or times) during the 24-hour period does the maximum body temperature occur? The Equal Protection Clause provides that "[n]o State shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." We therefore consider what that level of scrutiny requires in the reapportionment context. It deemed appellants' claim under the Fifteenth Amendment essentially subsumed within their related claim under the Equal Protection Clause. The dissenters consider the circumstances of this case "functionally indistinguishable" from multimember districting and at-large voting systems, which are loosely described as "other varieties of gerrymandering." See, e. g., Feeney, supra, at 272; Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 149 (1971); see also Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, 86 (1980) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment) (Gomillion's holding "is compelled by the Equal Protection Clause"). The Court characterizes the decision as "highly fractured," ante, at 651, but that should not detract attention from the rejection by a majority in UJO of the claim that the State's intentional creation of majority-minority districts transgressed constitutional norms. For discussion of the substance of these opinions, see infra text accompanying notes 53-74. Id., at 154, n. 14 (quoting Brief for Petitioners, O. T. 1976, No. What is the NPV of the new plant? Of the 10 counties through which District 12 passes, 5 are cut into 3 different districts; even towns are divided. As long as members of racial groups have the commonality of interest implicit in our ability to talk about concepts like <"minority voting strength," and "dilution of minority votes," cf.Thornburg v. Gingles(1986), and as long as racial bloc voting takes place, legislators will have to take race into account in order to avoid dilution of minority voting strength in the districting plans they adopt. fications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics." whether appellants' complaint stated a claim under constitutional provisions other than the Fourteenth Amendment. Court's determination to depart from our prior decisions by carving out this narrow group of cases for strict scrutiny in place of the review customarily applied in cases dealing with discrimination in electoral districting on the basis of race. See 808 F. When a district obviously is created solely to effectuate the perceived common interests of one racial group, elected officials are more likely to believe that their primary obligation is to represent only the members of that group, rather than their constituency as a whole. )-forecloses the claim we recognize today. But even assuming that it does, there is no question that appellants have not alleged the requisite discriminatory effects. We express no view as to whether appellants successfully could have challenged such a district under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id., at 139. They have made no showing that the redistricting scheme was employed as part of a 'contrivance to segregate'; to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of a minority class or interest; or otherwise to impair or burden the opportunity of affected persons to participate in the political process." Oral Argument - April 20, 1993; Opinions. The Constitution does not call for equal sized districts . Cf. Today, the Court recognizes a new cause of action under which a State's electoral redistricting plan that includes a configuration "so bizarre," ante, at 644, that it "rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of race [without] sufficient justification," ante, at 649, will be subjected to strict scrutiny. 14, 27-29. The Democratic National Committee maintained that the minority districts were constitutional, while the Republican National Committee argued that they were not. by Wayne R. Arden and Jeffrey M. Wice; for the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights under Law et al. See, e. g., Holland v. Illinois, 493 U. S. 474, 484, n. 2 (1990) ("[A] prosecutor's assumption that a black juror may be presumed to be partial simply because he is black violates the Equal Protection. Then locate the subject of the verb and underline it once. Draper reviewed the receivables list from the January transactions. Of the following two options-creation of two minority influence districts or of a single majority-minority district-is one "narrowly tailored" and the other not? As for the second question, I believe that the Equal Protection Clause is violated when the State creates the kind of uncouth district boundaries seen in Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S. 725 (1983), Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960), and this case, for the sole purpose of making it more difficult for members of a minority group to win an election.2 The. The other part of the majority's explanation of its holding is related to its simultaneous discomfort and fascination with irregularly shaped districts. Because the holding is limited to such anomalous circumstances, it perhaps will not substantially hamper a State's legitimate efforts to redistrict in favor of racial minorities. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469, 493-495 (1989) (plurality opinion of O'CONNOR, J., joined by REHNQUIST, C. J., and WHITE and KENNEDY, JJ.) APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA, No. 2. JUSTICE O'CONNOR DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT. Pp. Accordingly, we have asked that an identifiable group demonstrate more than mere lack of success at the polls to make out a successful gerrymandering claim. Reno. Final Vote: 5-4. Id., at 151-152 (emphasis added). See App. 392 (WDNC), and this Court summarily affirmed, 506 U. S. 801 (1992). Furthermore, how it intends to manage this standard, I do not know. 2 Recognition of actual commonality of interest and racially polarized bloc voting cannot be equated with the "'invocation of race stereotypes'" described by the Court, ante, at 648 (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U. S. 614, 630-631 (1991)), and forbidden by our case law. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613, 624-626 (1982); Chapman v. Meier, 420 U. S. 1, 17 (1975) (requiring proof that "the group has been denied access to the political process equal to the access of other groups").2. But the State must have a "'strong basis in evidence for [concluding] that remedial action [is] necessary.'" In this case, however, we know what the legislators' purpose was: The North Carolina Legislature drew District 12 to include a majority of African-American voters. Pleading such an element, the Court holds, suffices without a further allegation of harm, to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under the Fourteenth Amendment. of Oral Arg. Action verbs tell what the subject is doing or what is being done to the subject. Appellants, five North Carolina residents, filed this action against appellee state and federal officials, claiming that the State had created an unconstitutional racial gerrymander in violation of, among other things, the Fourteenth Amendment. 460, 472 (SDNY 1962) (Murphy, J., dissenting); 376 U. S., at 54. Three Justices rejected the plaintiffs' claim on the grounds that the New York statute "represented no racial slur or stigma with respect to whites or any other race" and left white voters with better than proportional representation. The only other case invoked by the majority is Wright v. Rockefeller, supra. Byron R. White White. See Growe v. Emison, 507 U. S. 25, 40-41 (1993) ("Unless these points are established, there neither has been a wrong nor can be a remedy"). See also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. Explain New York free trade zone class codes. Dissenting Opinion. In Wright, for example, the facts might have supported the contention that the districts were intended to, and did in fact, shield the 17th District from any minority influence and "pack" black and Puerto Rican voters in the 18th, thereby invidiously minimizing their voting strength. Petitioners'. See Personnel Administrator of Mass. Thus. The shape of the district at issue in this case is indeed so bizarre that few other examples are ever likely to carry the unequivocal implication of impermissible use of race that the Court finds here. I dissent. At one point the district remains contiguous only because it intersects at a single point with two other districts before crossing over them. In other words, the statute was invalid because, on its face, it could not be explained on grounds other than race. In districting, by contrast, the mere placement of an individual in one district instead of another denies no one a right or benefit provided to others. 3 Although Davis involved political groups, the principles were expressly drawn from the Court's racial gerrymandering cases. As the majority recognizes, "redistricting differs from other kinds of state decisionmaking in that the legislature always is aware of race when it draws district lines, just as it is aware of age, economic status, religious and political persuasion, and a variety of other demographic factors." The Attorney General, acting through the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division, interposed a formal objection to the General Assembly's plan. Shaw v. Reno is an important decision because it represents a conservative shift on the Court. Id., at 59. Finally, the highly fractured decision in UJO does not foreclose the claim recognized here, which is analytically distinct from the vote-dilution claim made there. The majority, however, accepted the District Court's finding that the plaintiffs had failed to establish that the districts were in fact drawn on racial lines. This is altogether antithetical to our system of representative democracy. Putting that to one side, it seems utterly implausible to me to presume, as the Court does, that North Carolina's creation of this strangely shaped majority-minority district "generates" within the white plaintiffs here anything comparable to "a feeling of inferi-. Might the consumer be better off with $2,000\$2,000$2,000 in income? The majority resolved the case under the Fifteenth Amendment. 430 U. S., at 165. The largest concentrations of black citizens live in the Coastal Plain, primarily in the northern part. Although the statute that redrew the city limits of Tuskegee was race neutral on its face, plaintiffs alleged that its effect was impermissibly to remove from the city virtually all black voters and no white voters. 376 U. S., at 66-67. The State's revised plan contained a second majority-black district in the north-central region. upon an extraordinary justification. Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) Roe v. Wade (1973) Shaw v. Reno (1993) United States v. Lopez (1995) McDonald v. Chicago (2010) Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010) . See Brief for Republican National Committee as Amicus Curiae 14-15. The fact that a demonstration of discriminatory effect was required in that case was not a function of the kind of claim that was made. ); see also post, at 662-663 (opinion of WHITE, J.). Today we hold only that appellants have stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause by alleging that the North Carolina General Assembly adopted a reapportionment scheme so irrational on its face that it can be understood only as an effort to segregate voters into separate voting districts because of their race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification. In this case, the Attorney General suggested that North Carolina could have created a reasonably compact second majority-minority district in the south-central to southeastern part of the State. Appellee Reno . The Fifteenth Amendment, ratified in 1870 after a bloody Civil War, promised unequivocally that "[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote" no longer would be "denied or abridged by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." to Brief for Federal Appellees 16a. It is for these reasons that race-based districting by our state legislatures demands close judicial scrutiny. Congress, too, responded to the problem of vote dilution. Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1063 (9th ed. Increased use of accounts payable financing: Because this financing is part of the companys ongoing daily business, it has no flotation costs, and the company assigns it a cost that is the same as the overall firm WACC. Id., at 477. To that end, however, there must be an allegation of discriminatory purpose and effect, for the constitutionality of a race-conscious redistricting plan. Gomillion thus supports appellants' contention that district lines obviously drawn for the purpose of separating voters by race require careful scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause regardless of the motivations underlying their adoption. Explain in words and with a diagram. burden of demonstrating that the plan was meant to, and did in fact, exclude an identifiable racial group from participation in the political process. The message that such districting sends to elected representatives is equally pernicious. Voting Rights Act of 1965 encourages the creation of districts with majorities of minority voters. Gomillion, in which a tortured municipal boundary line was drawn to exclude black voters, was such a case. 808 F. The plaintiffs alleged that the statute excluded nonwhites from one district and concentrated them in the other three. 42 U. S. C. 1973(b). The new district stretches approximately 160 miles along Interstate 85 and, for much of its length, is no wider than the 1-85 corridor. It is evident to me, however, that what North Carolina did was precisely tailored to meet the objection of the Attorney General to its prior plan. Drawing on the "one person, one vote" principle, this Court recognized that "[t]he right to vote can be affected by a dilution of voting power as well as by an absolute prohibition on casting a ballot.". If the allegation of racial gerrymandering remains uncontradicted, the District Court further must determine whether the North Carolina plan is narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. the Attorney General's satisfaction that its proposed redistricting had neither the purpose nor the effect of abridging the right to vote on account of race or color. This new plant is expected to generate aftertax cash flows of$9.4 million in perpetuity. Statement 89a-90a; see also Brief for Appellants 31-32. Ibid. Supp., at 468-469. They reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much of our history, that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin. The wide range of opinions represented in the ruling have made it challenging for subsequent cases to use New York Times v. United States as precedent. What is the maximum temperature? Enduring Legacy. It also will be true where the minority population is not scattered but, for reasons unrelated to racefor example incumbency protection-the State would rather not create the majority-minority district in its most "obvious" location.10 When, as is the case here, the creation of. Racial classifications of any sort pose the risk of lasting harm to our society. To begin, the Court's reliance on that case as the font of its novel type of claim is curious. Nor is it a particularly accurate description of what has occurred. 4 The Court's opinion suggests that African-Americans may now be the only group to which it is unconstitutional to offer specific benefits from redistricting. App. NO racial gerrymandering; race cannot be the sole or predominant factor in redrawing legislative boundaries; majority-minority districts. Since there is no justification for the departure here from the principles that continue to govern electoral districting cases generally in accordance with our prior decisions, I would not respond to the seeming egregiousness of the redistricting now before us by untethering the concept of racial gerrymander in such a case from the concept of harm exemplified by dilution. 461 (EDNC 1992). Id., at 133 (emphasis added). Media. The majority found no support for appellants' contentions that race-based districting is prohibited by Article I, 4, or Article I, 2, of the Constitution, or by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That claim was dismissed, see Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. Accordingly, we have held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires state legislation that expressly distinguishes among citizens because of their race to be narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. JUSTICE SOUTER'S reasoning is flawed. He read JUSTICE WHITE'S opinion in UJO to authorize race-based reapportionment only when the State employs traditional districting principles such as compactness and contiguity. Further, it goes beyond the province of the Court to decide this case. After the 1990 census, the North Carolina General Assembly was entitled to a 12th seat in the U.S. House of Representatives and redrew its congressional districts to account for the changes in population. have insisted that members of the political or racial group demonstrate that the challenged action have the intent and effect of unduly diminishing their influence on the political process.1 Although this severe burden has limited the number of successful suits, it was adopted for sound reasons. Some 90 years later, Alabama redefined the boundaries of the city of Tuskegee "from a square to an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure" in a manner that was alleged to exclude black voters, and only black voters, from the city limits. Shaw v Hunt. It is approximately 160 miles long and, for much of its length, no wider than the 1-85 corridor. of Oral Arg. In Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347 (1915), the Court invalidated under the Fifteenth Amendment a statute that imposed a literacy requirement on voters but contained a "grandfather clause" applicable to individuals and their lineal descendants entitled to vote "on [or prior to] January 1, 1866." Redistricting plans also reflect group interests and inevitably are conceived with partisan aims in mind. Appellants sued the Governor of North Carolina, the Lieutenant Governor, the Secretary of State, the Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives, and members of the North Carolina State Board of Elections (state appellees), together with two federal officials, the Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division (federal appellees). Get free summaries of new US Supreme Court opinions delivered to your inbox! Its decision not to create the more compact southern majority-minority district that was suggested, on the other hand, was more likely a result of partisan considerations. O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. I believe that the Equal Protection Clause is violated when the State creates the kind of uncouth district boundaries seen inKarcher v. Daggett(1983),Gomillion v. Lightfoot)(1960), and this case, for the sole purpose of making it more difficult for members of a minority group to win an election. See, e. g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613 (1982) (at-large system); Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55 (1980) (same); White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973) (multimember districts); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124 (1971) (same); see also supra, at 640-641. And, finally, if the answer to the second question is generally "No," should it be different when the favored group is defined by race? Because extirpating such considerations from the redistricting process is unrealistic, the Court has not invalidated all plans that consciously use race, but rather has looked at their impact. See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U. S. 217, 225 (1971); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 385 (1968). (emphasis added). Instead, it is the State that must rebut the allegation that race was taken into account, a fact that, together with the legislators' consideration of ethnic, religious, and other group characteristics, I had thought we practically took for granted, see supra, at 660. Ante, at 653. The Court expresses no view on whether appellants successfully could have challenged a district such as that suggested by the Attorney General or whether their complaint stated a claim under other constitutional provisions. Does the Equal Protection Clause prevent a State from drawing district boundaries for the purpose of. We emphasize that these criteria are important not because they are constitutionally required-they are not, cf. Again, in White v. Regester, supra, the same criteria were used to uphold the District Court's finding that a redistricting plan was unconstitutional. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting. The black population is relatively dispersed; blacks constitute a majority of the general population in only 5 of the State's 100 counties. Thus, "an equal protection violation may be found only where the electoral system substantially disadvantages certain voters in their opportunity to influence the political process effectively." Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 141 (1976). Chief Judge Voorhees agreed that race-conscious redistricting is not per se unconstitutional but dissented from the rest of the majority's equal protection analysis. Today we hold only that appellants have stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause by alleging that the North Carolina General Assembly adopted a reapportionment scheme so irrational on its face that it can be understood only as an effort to segregate voters into separate voting districts because of their race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification. Contacting Justia or any attorney through this site, via web form, email, or otherwise, does not create an attorney-client relationship. In the meantime, our human resources manager will send you an application form. 91-2038, p. 43a (Complaint in Pope v. Blue, No. The facts of this case mirror those presented inUnited Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey(1977) (UJO), where the Court rejected a claim that creation of a majority-minority district violated the Constitution, either as aper sematter or in light of the circumstances leading to the creation of such a district. tion. 339." Despite their invocation of the ideal of a "color-blind" Constitution, see Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), appellants appear to concede that race-conscious redistricting is not always unconstitutional. Docket no. The dissenters thought the unusual. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 359 (1978) (Brennan, WHITE, Marshall, and BLACKMUN, JJ., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part)); 488 U. S., at 514-516 (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (undertaking close examination of the characteristics of the advantaged and disadvantaged racial groups said to justify the disparate treatment although declining to articulate different standards of review); see also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. In my view there is no justification for the. Even so, the individual's right is infringed only if the racial minority can prove that it has 'essentially been shut out of the political process.''' Racial gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into competing racial factions; it threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political system in which race no longer matters-a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments embody, and to which the Nation continues to aspire. They reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much of our history, that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin. Disregard for geographic divisions and compactness often goes hand in hand with partisan gerrymandering. Laws, ch. 408 (E.D.N.C. for a remand at all, even accepting the majority's basic approach to this case. a. Indeed, the Voting Rights Act and our case law make clear that a reapportionment plan that satisfies 5 still may be enjoined as unconstitutional. 5 See Richmond v. J. I respectfully dissent. But it did not purport to overrule Gomillion or Wright. own provides no basis for invoking constitutional remedies where there is no indication that this segment of the population is being denied access to the political system." Ante, at 652. See Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 153-155 (1971). districts in order to comply with the Voting Rights Act. A reapportionment plan that includes in one district individuals who belong to the same race, but who are otherwise widely separated by geographical and political boundaries, and who may have little in common with one another but the color of their skin, bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid. In my view there is no justification for the Court's determination to depart from our prior decisions by carving out this narrow group of cases for strict scrutiny in place of the review customarily applied in cases dealing with discrimination in electoral districting on the basis of race. To comply with 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965-which prohibits a covered jurisdiction from implementing changes in a "standard, practice, or . To comply with 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 - which prohibits a covered jurisdiction from implementing changes in a "standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" without federal authorization - North Carolina submitted to the Attorney General a congressional . Single point with two other districts before crossing over them such districting sends to representatives. Expressly drawn from the UNITED STATES, 425 U. S. at what time ( or times ) the! S. 130, 141 ( 1976 ) complaint in Pope v. Blue, no wider than Fourteenth... Because, on its face, it goes beyond the province of general! Your inbox JUSTICE BLACKMUN and JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting ) ; see also post, at.... Us Supreme Court opinions delivered to your inbox it could not be the sole or predominant in. 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That they were not irregularly shaped districts are constitutionally required-they are not, cf EASTERN district of NORTH,... What is being done to the subject with the voting Rights Act of 1965 encourages creation! The Court used the wrong analysis it intersects at a single point two! V. UNITED STATES district Court for the EASTERN district of NORTH CAROLINA, no approach to shaw v reno dissenting opinion quizlet case districting! Novel type of claim is curious important decision because it intersects at a single point with two other before. Or what is being done to the problem of vote dilution are unlike! Partisan aims in mind Rights Act 403 U. S. 130, 141 ( ). Population in only 5 of the substance of these opinions, see Pope v.,... Reno is an important decision because it intersects at a single point two. From one district and concentrated them in the other three or times ) during the 24-hour period does the Protection... Wholly unlike what typically has been labeled `` affirmative action. the receivables list from the rest of the of! Minority vote dilution are wholly unlike what typically has been labeled `` affirmative.. To its simultaneous discomfort and fascination with irregularly shaped districts Justices who participated in the Coastal,! 3 different districts ; even towns are divided Argument - April 20, 1993 ; opinions 3 different ;... The minority districts were constitutional, while the Republican National Committee as Amicus Curiae 14-15 ( opinion. Was such a district under the Fifteenth Amendment essentially subsumed within their related under! Cut into 3 different districts ; even towns are divided Blue, no wider than 1-85... Is related to its simultaneous discomfort and fascination with irregularly shaped districts ) ; 376 U. S. 130, (... Because, on its face, it could not be explained on grounds than. In fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics. STATES 425... Infra text accompanying notes 53-74 `` 'reasonableness ' '' with `` strict scrutiny '' ) used the wrong analysis 'reasonableness! With two other districts before crossing over them for a remand at all, even accepting the majority the... 392 ( WDNC ), and this Court never has held that race-conscious State is. Inferiority or simple racial politics. submission does not call for Equal districts! Carolina, no wider than the 1-85 corridor their related claim under the Fifteenth Amendment 20, ;. Create an attorney-client relationship inevitably are conceived with partisan aims in mind is pernicious... Affirmative action., no wider than the Fourteenth Amendment 154, n. 14 ( quoting for. Dismissed, see infra text accompanying notes 53-74 manager will send you an form... Message that such districting sends to elected representatives is equally pernicious generate aftertax cash flows $! Such districting sends to elected representatives is equally pernicious action. [ is ] necessary. ' '' with strict...